Federal arrangements in Canada, as in other federal democratic polities, divide governmental jurisdictions between at least two levels of governance and therefore result in at least two levels of electoral competition.
the paper will first attempt to refine the term "federal-provincial integration" by constructing a typology of different forms of federal-provincial integration before reviewing the literature on the resulting four forms in Canada. In addition, this section will outline problems with the literature and how this paper addresses them. The second section will present the paper's research design. In particular, it will outline the three measures of behavioral integration that will be utilized in the analysis section. The third section will test the paper's hypotheses by measuring behavioral integration in a variety of forms. Finally, the paper will conclude by broadly evaluating federal-provincial integration in Canada since 1993 and by noting how a refined interpretation of such integration furthers our understanding of the Fourth Canadian Party System in general.
Literature Review
Federal-provincial integration might be defined simply as the linkages that exist between parties at the federal level and parties at the provincial level. The potential phenomenon that fall within such a broad definition, however, are both numerous and varied. As a result, it is necessary to be more precise in what form of integration is being addressed.
We can differentiate between forms of integration on the basis of two considerations: the primary entity addressed by the definition and whether it is the actions or the values of that entity that are being addressed. On the first basis, the entity addressed can be either a party as an organizational structure or an individual citizen. On the second basis, we can differentiate between entities on the basis of that entity's actions or values. Table 1 summarizes these different conceptions of federal-provincial party integration: Four distinct forms of party integration emerge from the typology presented above:
organizational, ideological, behavioral, and cognitive.
Organizational integration is concerned with the actions rather than the values of parties. It treats parties as organizational structures rather than as ideological vehicles or
repositories of values or policy and is therefore concerned with the formal and structural links between parties at the federal and provincial level. Organizational integration is the dominant form of integration studied in the literature on federalism. This is partially because party organization has been an important variable utilized by scholars to explain centralization or decentralization of party systems, an important topic following William Riker's assertion that federal stability is linked to decentralization of the party system. national and land elections in Austria by pointing to the decentralized organization of one of the main parties. 8 In addition, party organization has been widely utilized as a dependent variable in studies of federalism. Thorlakson, for example, explains organizational relations between national and sub-national parties by utilizing two institutional factors, "the degree of centralization of resources and the method of power division," as independent variables. 9 Thorlakson also examines policy distance between parties, but focuses predominantly on organizational integration.
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Organizational integration has been a strong focus in the Canadian integration literature as well. Rand Dyck provides an example of a scholar that views integration as a whole primarily as organizational integration. Of the eighteen "factors measuring degree of integration" he presents, nine can safely be classified as measurements of organizational integration while another three could arguably be classified as such. Stewart, 1989. 304-319. 13 It might appear that studies of party activists belong in the behavioral integration rather than the organizational integration category. I place such studies in the latter category because the activities of party activists under study, unlike those of voters or citizens that are examined in behavioral integration studies, are being performed in the capacity of workers for party organizations. 14 Smiley, Donald (1972) . 92 19 Dyck, Rand. 162. Smiley, Donald (1972) . 77 20 Thorlakson, Lori. 6 21 Dyck, Rand. 162. Smiley, Donald (1972 Addressing the decline in integration between parties of identical partisan designation in 1980, Johnston remarked that "In a province a party's ideological and power positions may differ radically between provincial and federal levels, and, to be consistent, a voter may have to switch between parties." 40 A move away from integration on the basis of partisan designation clearly existed and reached its apex in the 1993 federal election, which spawned the fourth federal party system. 41 However, it is not clear that federalprovincial integration either on the basis of partisan designation or as a whole has declined in the fourth party system. This paper seeks to address these problems as well as explore the nature and extent of federal-provincial integration in the fourth federal party system, particularly the comparative extent to which non-truncated and truncated federal parties integrate with parties at the provincial level. Of the four forms of integration, this paper seeks to help correct the imbalance of the literature by focusing on behavioral integration. In order to address the view that federal integration as a whole has declined as a result of the rise of truncated parties and the decline of more integrated parties in the fourth federal party system, this paper's thesis is that Canadian federal parties continue to integrate voters more effectively through parties of identical partisan designation than through parties of different partisan designations. 
Research Design
This section outlines the research design of the paper. In addition to outlining the methods that will be utilized in the paper's analysis, it will also address potential weaknesses in the research design.
The intent of the paper is to examine behavioral integration in the fourth Canadian party system, which Carty, Cross, and Young define as beginning with the dealigning 1993 federal election. 42 In order to do so, I utilize survey data from the 1997 Canadian and has two advantages. The first is that, unlike the first measure, it can account for a federal party's integrative relationships without being influenced by the number of such relationships. The second advantage is that the measure communicates a benefit for a federal party by summarizing the votes it receives from different provincial parties; thus it is accurate to say that a federal party that receives a higher value than another has been more "successful" in integrating voters between the two parties. The third measure is a statistical measure of correlation, Kendall's tau-b. Tau-b measures both the strength and direction of the association between two variables. In addition, the measure is adaptable;
it can be applied to relationships between both individual parties and different groups of parties. This measure is appropriate because the two questions outlined above were subsequently recoded into ordinal variables.
The first hypothesis requires that relationships between federal and provincial parties be distinguished between non-truncated (parties at different levels which are of the same partisan designation) and truncated (parties of different partisan designations)
parties. Measuring integration between non-truncated federal and provincial parties requires simply utilizing parties of the same name. The measurement of integration between truncated parties, however, is more difficult, since criteria for selecting which provincial parties will be included in the analysis is required. For this paper, the threshold for provincial parties to be considered for a potential truncated voting relationship with a federal party is for it to receive 35% or higher on the federal vote measure. This threshold reflects that federal parties may integrate in a meaningful sense with more than a single provincial party in a single province, but is not so low as to render the measure essentially meaningless. In order to facilitate meaningful comparisons between non-truncated and truncated integration, non-truncated provincial parties that did not receive 35% or higher on the federal vote measure were similarly deleted from the analysis. In order to test the extent to which federal parties integrate voters through nontruncated or truncated parties, the admissible relationships between federal and provincial parties must be divided into non-truncated and truncated categories. Table two presents the measures of integration for the federal parties' non-truncated and truncated relationships. For these measures, the national electorate rather than provincial electorates are used: In the case of the federal and provincial vote measures, non-truncated parties integrate voters to a greater extent than do truncated parties. For every federal party except Reform, voters for a federal party were more likely to vote for a provincial nontruncated party then they were for a truncated party of a different partisan label. In addition, every voter for a provincial party was more likely to vote for a federal counterpart with an identical partisan label rather than another party. Only federal Reform voters were more likely to vote for a truncated provincial party, and this low score may have resulted from there being only a single provincial Reform Party. Provincial Reform voters, however, were more likely to stick with the non-truncated federal Reform Party.
Analysis
The tau-b measure tells a similar story: all of the relationships between non-truncated voting are significant and (with the exception of Reform) higher than the relationship between voting for non-truncated paired parties. The exception is Reform voters, where an equal relationship between non-truncated and truncated voting existed. On the basis of these measures of behavioral integration, it must be concluded that parties integrate 46 Neither the federal nor the provincial vote percentages presented in this table are the federal or provincial vote scores described in the previous section. Rather they are the percentage of shared votes as a percentage of the national vote.
voters more effectively through non-truncated counter-parts at the different levels rather than through truncated parties at the other level.
Federal and provincial parties, however, integrate voters to differing extents and in different ways. To help determine differences in the nature and extent of integration between federal parties, such parties are classified according to: the number of relationships in general, the number of non-truncated and truncated links with provincial parties, the strength of these links, the imbalance between shared votes, and the territorial distribution of these integrative linkages. The federal parties do not differ greatly in the total number of relationships they share with provincial parties; they range from a low of seven for the N. These groups of provinces demonstrate similarity in the proportions of those With regards to non-truncated relationships, supporters of provincial parties in groups one and three were similarly likely to vote for the parties represented in those relationships at the federal level (45.1% and 48.0%). Group two (or Quebec) exhibits the strongest non-truncated relationship. Groups one and two differ in the strength of their truncated relationships; group three is significantly stronger in this area than is group one.
Group two exhibits the weakest truncated provincial vote score and the greatest divergence between non-truncated and truncated relationships.
The above finding cautions against utilizing only the number of links in each province as a measure of integration in that province. On the provincial vote measure, group three integrated voters more effectively through both non-truncated and truncated relationships despite that the provinces in group three contained four significant linkages each while the provinces in group one contained six.
Three conclusions can be drawn from the above analysis and utilized to help further our understanding of the fourth federal party system. First, non-truncated integrative relationships between federal and provincial parties in general were stronger than truncated relationships. Voters were still more likely to vote for parties of identical partisan affiliation at the federal and provincial levels rather than for parties of different partisan affiliations. Second, significant differences exist in the extent to which this is true for voters for the different federal parties. The five parties did not differ greatly in the number of significant integrative relationships they shared with provincial parties (with the exception of the B.Q., which shared only a single integrative relationship). They 53 While the N.D.P. and the P.C. Party lacked strong regional bases, both these parties became competitive in the Atlantic region in the 1997 election. Regions based upon patterns of integration, however, cut across these party lines. B.C., Saskatchewan, and the Atlantic region were characterized by both a high number of linkages and a comparably high rate of truncated linkages. Alberta, Manitoba, and Ontario were characterized by a lower number of linkages and a lower rate of truncated linkages, but these relationships in general were stronger than in the other provinces. It would appear that the first group of provinces has moved further from the traditional model of "affiliation integration" than the second, and that the resulting high number of truncated linkages has weakened integration in general in these provinces as a result of the generally weaker nature of truncated relationships compared to non-integrated relationships. 54 Whether the first group is more "developed" in its apparent movement away from the traditional model of integration, however, remains to be seen. A strengthening of truncated relationships in the first group and a movement toward more truncated relationships in the second group would substantiate this view.
The conclusions that have been drawn from this paper's analysis are limited by the paper's focus on the behavioral form of integration and its confinement to the 1997 federal election and preceding provincial election. Its conclusions could be either further substantiated or challenged by expanding this paper's scope to other forms of integration or to different elections since 1993. Federal-provincial integration in Canada, while affected by the 1993 electoral realignment, contains themes of both continuity and change. In both cases, the examination of federal-provincial integration contributes to an 53 understanding of Canada's new party system and to the discussion of current federal electoral politics. Further changes to patterns of integration are likely to follow further changes to the federal party system as a whole, adding another dimension of importance to the discussion of the 1997 and 2000 elections as either deviating or realigning elections.
